EU Foreign Policy Between the
Revolution and the Status Quo. IES Policy Brief Issue 2014/09/November 2014 by Biscop, Sven
æPolicy  brief
by Sven Biscop
A new High Representative – that means it is time for a new 
European Security Strategy (ESS). Many academics will be dusting 
off their policy papers from exactly five years ago. It will be a big 
pile of papers, for it would be hard to find an academic who did not 
think that the foreign and security policy of the European Union (EU) 
was lacking in strategic guidance. And it will be a lot of dust, for the 
outgoing High Representative – Catherine Ashton – has studiously 
ignored all of them for the past five years. 
Her successor, Federica Mogherini, has however received a 
“strategic” mandate from the December 2013 European Council. 
It reads: “in close cooperation with the Commission”, she is “to 
assess the impact of changes in the global environment, and to 
report to the Council in the course of 2015 on the challenges and 
opportunities arising for the Union, following consultations with the 
Member States”. This is the somewhat cryptic compromise resulting 
from the unresolved debate about whether or not to review the 
2003 ESS. Many Member States remain doubtful as to the added 
value of a strategic review (and ironically those who have the most 
elaborate national strategic processes express the most doubt). 
So do most of the officials of the European External Action Service 
(EEAS) who were involved in the failed 2008 attempt at revision (an 
ill-timed exercise which resulted only in a rightly forgotten report 
on the implementation of the ESS). 
Yet nobody can deny that the global environment is effectively 
changing – rapidly and dramatically. This was already the case in 
2008, when it was clear to all that the rise of the BRICS and of China 
in particular had been much faster than expected, with enormous 
implications for Europe’s aim of establishing a rules-based global 
order. It is obvious today when turmoil on all of Europe’s borders 
has put the regional order in great peril. In many areas of external 
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action it has become impossible for the EU to carry on with 
existing policies as if nothing had happened. Dare anyone still 
deny with a straight face the urgency of a strategic review? 
Forget about Form 
The question then is: how to go about it? Since 2008 the strategic 
debate has often been hijacked by issues of form: should a new 
ESS be drafted or is another type of document required? Who will 
do the drafting? Who will adopt it? The new High Representative 
would be well advised to leave all issues of form aside for 
now. Instead, she has a great opportunity to use the European 
Council’s mandate to launch a thorough debate on substance 
in order to generate a consensus on the broad priorities that 
she sees for her (first) five-year term. In effect she could thus 
generate her own mandate that would subsequently empower 
her to initiate policy. 
After Mogherini has submitted the report to the European 
Council as the mandate requires, the “end product” to be aimed 
at for now could thus be a statement of policy intentions by the 
High Representative herself. This statement could be based on 
the European Council’s endorsement of her report, rather than a 
document that is formally adopted by the European Council. For 
example, such a statement could take the form of a speech in the 
European Parliament. Just as national foreign ministers present 
their policy intentions after a few months in every term of office, 
so it is but logical that at the EU level the High Representative 
does the same for each term of office. 
As a first step in implementing the mandate, Mogherini’s report 
to the European Council could start with a brief analysis of recent 
events and developments at the regional as well as global level, 
in order to outline which existing EU policies have been the 
most affected and therefore require substantial reassessment. 
Three crucial areas immediately come to mind: (1) the regional 
order and the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), including 
the multilateral forums of the Eastern Partnership and the Union 
for the Mediterranean; (2) the global order and the strategic 
partnerships including, of course, that with the US; and (3) 
Europe’s role as a security provider and the state of defence in 
Europe. In order to involve the Commission and the Member 
States in this assessment, as the mandate requires, a seminar 
could be organised convening representatives from all relevant 
actors as well as academics. No drawn-out seminar series is 
necessarily required: a single two-day seminar, leaving time for 
profound discussion and including experts who think out-of-the-
box in order to ensure creative reflection, can be sufficient. 
As a second step, building on the European Council’s 
endorsement of her report, the High Representative could then 
in a policy statement set out her views on which policies, as a 
matter of priority, she will seek to review and revamp. At a later 
stage, a formal new ESS (perhaps under a different title) could be 
a third step, codifying the outcome of the High Representative’s 
new orientation in a strategy adopted by the European Council. 
The High Representative’s policy statement ought to be 
positively framed and express an ambition to achieve objectives, 
rather than a defensive reaction against threats. Pessimism has 
never been known to motivate anyone. A realistic yet optimistic 
policy statement will provide a narrative, explaining to citizens, 
parliaments and third countries the distinctive contribution of 
the EU to international affairs. At the same time it will offer a 
strategic impulse, giving a sense of purpose to the EEAS and 
the external services of the Commission, and guide day-to-day 
policy-making. 
Such a statement would need to focus on just three or four big 
issues. The aim is not to address every item of external action, 
but to highlight which issues collective external action through 
the EU will bring the most added value. Such issues will be of 
vital importance to all Member States, yet too big for any single 
one of them to address them alone. In other words, it must 
focus on the issues on which the EU can prove that it is better at 
defending the Member States’ national interest than the Member 
States themselves. 
Remember the Revolution 
Mogherini’s task is not only to set priorities but also to review 
how, through which instruments, these priorities can best be 
achieved. Which type of strategy should the EU pursue or, in 
even bigger terms, which type of power does the EU seek to be? 
It may not fit in exactly with how most European diplomats see 
themselves, but the ESS outlines an agenda for what in political 
science terms is called a revolutionary power. To state that “the 
quality of international society depends on the quality of the 
governments that are its foundation” is to say in very couched 
yet clear terms that we do not think that quality is now assured. 
To add that “the best protection for our security is a world of 
well-governed democratic states” and that “spreading good 
governance, supporting social and political reform, dealing with 
corruption and abuse of power, establishing the rule of law and 
protecting human rights are the best means of strengthening the 
international order” is nothing less than a call for regime-change 
across the globe. Gradually and smoothly may be how we would 
like to see this happen, and certainly not by force of arms, but a 
revolutionary agenda it is. 
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Yet in contrast with its ambitious rhetoric, in practice the EU 
more often behaves as a status quo power. The clearest 
symptom is our addiction to partnership as a way of conducting 
international relations. It sometimes seems as if just about every 
country has a partnership of some kind or other with the EU. 
In reality of course partnership cannot be the beginning of a 
diplomatic relationship but is its desired end-state. For effective 
partnership is only possible if there is sufficient consensus on 
foreign policy objectives and the way to achieve them to enable 
systematic consultation and regular joint action. Even with many 
of our so-called strategic partners that is not the case – unless 
one counts the fact that Russia’s intervention in Ukraine has 
stimulated Europe’s defence efforts as an emanation of the 
strategic partnership. Rather than stimulating its “partners” to 
change (for why would they as they are on the list of the “good 
guys” already) the EU itself has become tainted by associating 
too uncritically with all kinds of unsavoury regimes. That is the 
consequence of something that happens rather too often in the 
EU: after a while it begins to mistake an aspirational notion in 
one of its policies for reality. Thus, Brussels ended up believing 
that all those which it had dubbed partners really were partners 
(or that the way its policies divided the world really reflected 
reality on the ground, as if there was “a line in the sand” marking 
the borders of the ENP). Our southern neighbourhood is a case in 
point: the EU gave up on its reform agenda in favour of a status 
quo policy that seemed to meet its concerns over terrorism, 
migration and energy supply. And then came the Arab Spring… 
The resulting image is one of a timid and reactive EU. 
The easiest way to overcome this problem of double standards 
would be to simply give up on the high-flown rhetoric and pursue 
a status quo strategy in words as well as in deeds. That however 
is not an option for the EU. Why? Because the notion that “the 
best protection for our security is a world of well-governed 
democratic states” is absolutely true. Only where governments 
equally provide for the security, freedom and prosperity of all 
of their citizens can there be lasting peace and security: this is 
the core idea of the ESS. The EU itself aspires to live up to these 
egalitarian values (which the Lisbon Treaty has enshrined in the 
Treaty on European Union), and is indeed the most egalitarian 
region on the planet (which is a greater source of legitimacy than 
many realise). Stimulating governments outside the EU to do 
likewise for their citizens effectively is the best way of ensuring 
our interests in the long term. The EU should not – cannot – give 
up on this agenda of the ESS but it must find better ways of 
achieving it. 
Therefore a middle way has to be found – neither dreamy 
idealism nor unprincipled pragmatism. The revolutionary agenda 
has proved to be far too optimistic. If change does not emerge 
organically from within a country, it cannot be engineered from 
the outside – all attempts to do so have ended in disaster. In such 
circumstances playing a reforming role is extremely difficult. 
But an external actor can still attempt to play a moderating 
role, aiming to curb excesses by exerting pressure (with the 
Responsibility to Protect as the ultimate emergency break in case 
of the gravest violations). However, a pure status quo policy has 
also proved to be harmful to our interests. Regimes that do not 
provide for the security, freedom and prosperity of their citizens 
are inherently unstable and will eventually implode or explode 
– one cannot count on long-term cooperation therefore. When 
change does occur, driven internally, we have to be on the right 
side of history. 
The middle way could be an activist strategy of pragmatic 
idealism. To remain consistent with ourselves, we have to adhere 
to the long-term overall objective of “a world of well-governed 
democratic states”, but in the knowledge that it will only be 
reached through mostly incremental steps. 
Where, for the time being at least, the situation seems impervious 
to change we should at least not do anything that puts even more 
obstacles in the way of achieving “well-governed democratic 
states”. Hence a pure status quo policy of cooperation with the 
powers that be is not an option. This does not mean that we 
cannot cooperate at all with them. On the contrary, we should 
seek to continuously engage all relevant actors in such countries, 
the opposition and civil society as well as the regime – but we 
cannot cooperate with any regime in ways that strengthen its 
authoritarian foundations. To put it very bluntly: rendition of 
terrorist suspects to be “interrogated” by the security services of 
an autocracy while preaching about human rights is not good for 
our credibility. But we definitely ought to engage economically: 
trade and even more so investment leading to job creation are the 
best ways of permeating a society. And while Europeans invest 
around the world, it is notably in our southern neighbourhood 
that investment has been lagging behind. 
When a situation is unfrozen and change does occur it can be 
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for better or for worse, but then at least there will be a chance 
of improvement. This is when, building on the legitimacy that a 
policy of pragmatic idealism ought to have endowed us with, we 
can actively attempt to generate multiplier effects, and to steer 
change in a direction that is beneficial to our interests. While 
our preferred instruments are diplomatic and economic, military 
intervention is an option if change creates security concerns. A 
cost-benefit evaluation must determine, on a case-by-case basis, 
whether European military involvement is called for. If we do not 
intervene, will there be a threat against our vital interests? And 
what will be the humanitarian consequences for the population 
of the country itself? If we do intervene, what are the chances of 
averting the threat and creating the conditions in which change 
for the better can be consolidated? And what will be the risk of 
creating negative effects (such as escalation to other countries), 
of incurring casualties among our forces and collateral damage? 
In our own broad neighbourhood it will certainly increasingly be 
up to us Europeans to make that calculation, to take the political 
initiative to develop a response, and to forge the coalition that 
can deliver it – for the US will no longer automatically do that 
for us. 
Conclusion
Trade-offs are inevitable. When choosing to intervene militarily 
against IS in Iraq and Syria, one cannot do without regional actors 
in the coalition, even if many of those countries themselves 
sustain practices (such as decapitating criminals and hanging 
homosexuals) that are absolutely at odds with universal values. 
Academics may try and develop elegant strategic concepts, 
but unfortunately elegance cannot always be preserved when 
conducting foreign and security policy. And yet these strategic 
concepts can help us to make decisions, to assess what is 
important for us and what is not, which responses are possible 
and which are not, and which resources we ought to allocate 
to them. It is of crucial importance therefore that Federica 
Mogherini revives the strategic debate in Brussels and between 
Brussels and the Member States. Pragmatic idealism ought 
to ensure two things: that the EU remains true to universal 
egalitarian values and thus to itself, and that it plays an active, 
leading role. Sometimes taking the lead will lead to failure, but 
oftentimes it will lead to success – passively accepting the course 
of events will never. 
This Policy Brief builds on the ‘What way forward for European Defence?’ 
policy link panel at the recent #EUIA14 conference and was made possible 
thanks to the financial assistance of the European Commission’s Jean 
Monnet programme. For more information about the conference, please 
visit: www.ies.be/euia2014/.
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